What do Israel and Hamas really want from a ceasefire in Gaza?

Earlier this month, Israel and Hamas announced a ceasefire in the two-year-old war in Gaza. The United States partially mediated the agreement, but American officials are concerned, according to New York timesIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may try to end the matter. Indeed, since the ceasefire began, nearly a hundred Palestinians and two Israeli soldiers have been killed. (In the first phase of the deal, Israel still controls approximately 53% of the Gaza Strip.)

I recently spoke by phone with Michael Milstein, chair of the Palestine Studies Forum at Tel Aviv University. Milstein served as senior advisor to the commander Coordinator of government activities in the regionswho oversees civilian policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and is the head of the Palestinian Affairs Department in the Military Intelligence Wing of the IDF. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what Netanyahu wants for Gaza, Hamas’ strategic goal of controlling the Palestinian national movement, and why a permanent ceasefire in Gaza will be so difficult.

If this ceasefire is to work, what will it look like over the next few months? What is the best scenario?

Most or perhaps all scenarios will be bad, so we’re not talking about the best case, but the least bad. This will mark the beginning of a new order, that is, the establishment of a new Palestinian regime in Gaza, which does not include Hamas. There will be a symbolic deployment of international forces, and some kind of coordination system between Israel, the United States, and other international forces regarding any violations of the ceasefire. Then Israel will be able to act immediately against any challenge or threat that develops in Gaza, and get warnings about a plan to launch missiles or smuggle weapons or things like that. That would be a better case.

At the same time, I must say in a very frank way, this best case also means that Israel will not control most of the territory in Gaza, except perhaps several areas near the border. This is the only part that Israel will keep. In this scenario, Hamas is committed to keeping only defensive weapons, such as rifles, grenades, and pistols. They will not be able to possess offensive weapons, especially missiles.

Accordingly, there will be some kind of disarmament of Hamas, Israel will not launch attacks, and an international force will help secure Gaza, as stipulated in the ceasefire agreement. I assume when you said you wanted to be “very frank” you meant that a solution like this could also prevent Israeli expansionist fantasies in Gaza, right?

Yes. There are still many people here in Israel who say that our goal is not just to defeat Hamas, but actually to make the Palestinians disappear from Gaza or perhaps even deport them. This fantasy will not happen. What’s more, I believe that Hamas cannot be persuaded to give up its weapons completely. But I think that if Hamas does not have the same strength that it had two years ago, and will not be able to commit again on October 7, and will be permanently constrained by Israel and international forces, I think that is not a bad situation for Israel.

You say there’s no great solution here, but you’ve identified what you think might be better or less bad.

This is correct.

But does either side want that? How do you understand at this stage what Hamas and the Netanyahu government want? Let’s start with Netanyahu.

I think he does not want the current ceasefire. He was forced to accept it, because it was imposed on him. Of course, there is a very wide gap between his demands for a ceasefire and what actually happened. For example, he demanded that there be a very clear commitment on the part of Hamas to complete disarmament. Of course we don’t see that now. I am sure that the Netanyahu government will not be happy with the scenario I described above. I think that perhaps another government in Israel, when there are elections, would be more comfortable with such a scenario. I believe that other players, such as Türkiye and Qatar, would be very satisfied with such a scenario, because they would be able to keep Hamas as a player in Gaza. But, at the same time, they can say that there is some kind of change, even if it is a cosmetic change.

As far as the United States is concerned, I am certain that there will be no way to implement all the goals they have put forward, for example, completely disarming Hamas or convincing Hamas to accept all the international forces that Vice President J.D. Vance talked about during his recent trip to Israel. He talked about forces from Indonesia and the Gulf that could be deployed in Gaza. But the presence of a large international force is something I think Hamas has some reservations about.

Netanyahu has resisted a ceasefire for a long time. You said that a ceasefire was imposed on him. But what does he want? When we spoke a few months ago, you would have thought Netanyahu was flirting with the expansionist views on Gaza resettlement expressed by his right-wing ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir. What do you think he really wants now?

What he really wants is to be able to declare Hamas defeated, even if that means occupying most or perhaps all of Gaza, and even staying there. Smotrich and Ben Gvir are keen to occupy Gaza, of course, and even encourage Palestinians to emigrate from Gaza. Regarding Netanyahu, I think he understands that he cannot convince many people in Israel today that he defeated Hamas. And I think he’s very embarrassed by the fact that Hamas still exists, that Hamas is still the dominant player in Gaza. If he had the choice, he would have preferred to continue the war. It appears that President Trump was the one who decided to end the war.

What I find very strange about this from Netanyahu’s point of view is the following: You say that he does not want Hamas to remain in charge of Gaza.

This is correct.

But my understanding is that he also does not want the Palestinian Authority [P.A.] He certainly does not want the conditions in Gaza to make the establishment of a Palestinian state possible.